Special report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission of
Support in East Timor

Source: UN Security Council
Date: 3 Mar 2003

S/2003/243

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution
1410 (2002) of 17 May 2002, in which the Council decided to establish, as
of 20 May 2002, for an initial period of 12 months, the United Nations
Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET). In paragraph 7 of that
resolution, the Council decided that the "downsizing of UMMISET should
proceed as quickly as possible, after careful assessment of the situation
on the ground" and in paragraph 13 requested to be kept closely and
regularly informed of progress towards the implementation of the resolution
including, in particular, progress towards achievement of the milestones in
the mandate implementation plan.

2. In this context, the present report describes significant changes in the
situation on the ground that have taken place since my report of 6 November
2002 (S/2002/1223) that suggest the need for a review of the Mission's
downsizing schedule. It includes specific proposals for adjustments to the
downsizing plan to allow the Mission to accomplish its mandated tasks
successfully by June 2004 within this changed environment.

II. Political and security context

3. The mandate implementation plan that was endorsed by the Security
Council was prepared at a time of optimism. In the months preceding the
establishment of UNMISET, Timor-Leste had successfully held two national
elections, both of which had taken place without violence. The
establishment of the country's Government, public administration, police
and armed forces was proceeding smoothly.

4. This progress continued in the following six months, as reflected in my
report to the Security Council of 6 November 2002 (S/2002/1223). The
Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste formally took its place among the
nations of the world on 20 May 2002, and shortly thereafter became the
191st Member State of the world Organization. The foundations were
developed for a strong relationship between Timor-Leste and neighbouring
countries. While the economic situation and the threat of terrorism
presented significant challenges to the new Government, the mandate
implementation and mission downsizing plans endorsed by the Security
Council appeared to remain a valid and realistic road map for the immediate
future.

5. However, the period since my previous report has seen a sharp increase
in the frequency and magnitude of security-related incidents. These have
demonstrated the scope of problems that might still emerge and the
inadequacy of the means to address them, and they strongly suggest the need
to adjust the downsizing plan for UNMISET to reflect changed circumstances.

6. The potential for grave civil disturbance became clear with the riots
that erupted in Dili on 4 December 2002. While earlier disturbances in
Baucau from 18 to 26 November 2002 had suggested that the Timor-Leste
police could face exacting challenges in urban areas, the riot in Dili was
on a quite different scale. It developed from a protest at the Parliament
building, and was manipulated by elements that directed those involved to
targets that were apparently selected to undermine the authority and
legitimacy of the Government. As was reported to the Security Council at
the time, in the course of these riots, numerous buildings were destroyed
by arson, including houses owned by the Prime Minister and members of his
family and foreign-owned businesses, and other buildings were looted.
Seventeen Timorese sustained gunshot injuries, and two of them died. The
mosque in Dili was damaged, and houses within its compound were burned.
Efforts to restore order were slow to take effect, revealing a number of
weaknesses that are discussed below.

7. A further serious incident took place on 4 January 2003, when a group of
20 to 30 men armed with automatic weapons attacked villages near the town
of Atsabe, in Ermera district. Five people were killed during these
attacks. There were suggestions by local officers and members of the
communities involved that the victims included people who were targeted
because of their pro-independence political backgrounds, and that former
militia members were involved; however, the precise motivation for the
violence in Atsabe, the source of support for the assailants and the degree
to which they were part of a larger group have not been satisfactorily
established.

8. In response to a request from the Government, UNMISET temporarily handed
over responsibility for the defence of an area of operations around these
villages to permit the Timor-Leste defence force (Falintil-FDTL) to conduct
a sweeping operation. In the following days more than 90 people were
arrested, all but 39 of whom were released immediately by the police. Those
remaining in custody were sent to Dili for further judicial action and
subsequently released by a Timorese judge.

9. On 24 February, a small group of men armed with semi-automatic weapons
attacked a shuttle bus travelling from Maliana in Bobonaro district to the
capital. Two people were killed in the attack, and five were injured.
UNMISET military and Timorese and United Nations police were deployed to
the area immediately. On 27 February, an UNMISET military patrol exchanged
fire with a group of armed men in the area, apprehending one. However, at
the time of reporting, the motivation for the attack on the bus remains
unclear.

10. In addition to these armed attacks, there is now an increasing amount
of credible evidence to suggest that former militias and armed groups may
be establishing bases within the country with the objective of undermining
stability. This includes testimony by a member of an armed group arrested
in Liquica district in early January suggesting that several other, similar
groups have been established in Timor-Leste to create instability in the
country, drawing on external means, although without any official
endorsement. Recent sightings of suspicious groups, the discovery of caches
of weapons in rural areas and increases in thefts of food and cattle all
seem to support such concerns. These incidents have had a disquieting
impact on the country, which is at a very early stage in its economic and
political development.

11. It seems reasonable to expect further challenges. Increased activity of
armed groups may be generated by politically motivated elements, as well as
by criminals. Those who seek to create difficulties can draw upon a largely
youthful and unskilled population, which suffers a very high rate of
unemployment, has as yet little knowledge and experience of political
mechanisms to address such problems and has had extensive exposure to
violence in the past.

12. This situation may be exacerbated by elements within the former refugee
population located in Indonesia close to the Tactical Coordination Line.
Former militia personalities retain a degree of influence among the
approximately 28,000 former refugees remaining in Indonesia (according to
figures of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees)
and are actively involved in cross-border trade; some have accumulated
considerable wealth from a mixture of legal and illegal activities. This
threat is likely to remain extant throughout the remainder of the UNMISET
mandate and beyond, although supportive actions by the Indonesian military
would contribute to mitigating and containing it. The Government of
Indonesia has indicated that it intends to resettle former East Timorese
refugees. Voluntary migration to other provinces could significantly
improve the security environment. While Indonesia has begun the process, it
has so far been unable to implement it fully due to financial and other
constraints.

13. The 30 June target date for a finalized agreement on a line that
constitutes the border remains in effect, but the accomplishment of this
objective is not assured. During the first meeting of the Joint Border
Commission between the Governments of Timor-Leste and Indonesia, held in
Jakarta on 18 and 19 December 2002, the two Governments reaffirmed their
commitments in this regard and agreed on a set of technical specifications
and a work plan. A subsequent meeting of a technical group on border
demarcation and regulation, which was initially postponed, is now scheduled
to take place in March.

14. Border delineation, and subsequent demarcation, if decided, are clearly
of great importance in terms of removing a potential irritant to future
relations between the neighbouring countries. At the same time, it must
also be recognized that this cannot be a panacea for all security problems,
and that even a well-defined border will remain porous.

15. Indonesian military authorities have indicated that their policy is not
to demilitarize their side of the border, where they will maintain a troop
and not a border police presence. The Timor-Leste Government is nonetheless
proceeding with plans for police and civilian authorities to assume
responsibility for border management.

III. Addressing security challenges

16. In the uncertain environment described above, it is essential that the
necessary security capability be in place to safeguard and build upon all
that has been achieved over the past three years. However, the events of
recent months suggest that serious deficiencies in Timorese and
international capabilities already exist, and can invite further problems;
these deficiencies would be exacerbated if UNMISET continued to follow its
current downsizing plan.

17. At least a year of further development is required before the Timorese
police are in a position to address the more demanding kinds of problems
that have emerged over the past few months. Their premature engagement in
such activities runs the risk of weakening them and of lowering their
public standing. Furthermore, if the police are seen to be ineffective,
there will be increasing political pressure to involve Falintil-FDTL in
activities for which it is not mandated, trained or equipped, and which
could undermine its own essential development process.

18. On the basis of its mandate to provide interim law enforcement and
public security, to assist in the development of the Timor-Leste police,
and to contribute to the maintenance of external and internal security in
Timor-Leste, UNMISET has a crucial role to play. However, the downsizing
plans that were endorsed 10 months ago would, if followed without change,
further weaken the Mission's real and perceived ability to respond.
Adjustments are necessary if UNMISET is to maintain security effectively in
the short term and to prepare the Timorese agencies to assume their full
responsibility in the future.

19. At the request of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, former
Military Adviser Maurice Baril led a review and assessment mission to
UNMISET from 15 to 23 January 2003, as the Department's first
Inspector-General. The aim of the mission was to review the capability of
UNMISET to implement its mandate and to meet future challenges. The
recommendations in the present report are supported by and draw upon his
findings, as an external expert, regarding key areas where sustained or
increased capacity is crucial for UNMISET to achieve its mandate.

A. Revised military strategy

20. As reflected in my report of 17 April 2002 (S/2002/432, paras. 87-98),
the military component of UNMISET was mandated to provide continued support
for the external security and territorial integrity of East Timor, while
ensuring timely handover of responsibilities to Falintil-FDTL and to
relevant public administration departments. The downsizing plan was
predicated on the assumption that the threat from former militia elements
would gradually diminish, that new threats of a similar scale would not
emerge and that major civil disturbances would not occur, so that
challenges on the ground would be on a scale for which Timor-Leste security
agencies could assume an increasing level of responsibility.

21. However, in the evolving security situation described above, these
earlier assumptions no longer appear valid. The military component lacks
the necessary capacity and mobility to respond effectively or take a
sufficiently proactive role to address the threats, and has inadequate
ability to obtain and process information. Were downsizing to continue,
significantly reduced troop densities would not deter the serious security
threat posed by armed bands in rural areas, while the diminished military
presence in the westernmost districts would ease the task of criminals or
other elements intent on moving illegally across the Tactical Coordination
Line. At the same time, UNMISET would face still greater obstacles in
assisting in the event of large-scale civil disturbance. While planning for
Timor-Leste police is being adjusted, the measures proposed to enhance
their capacity could produce substantive results by January 2004 at the
earliest.

22. Adjustments to the military strategy and configuration of UNMISET in
the following areas could help it to promote stability and to provide the
time required for the Timorese security agencies to become operationally
ready to assume their tasks:

* Establishment within an extended zone adjacent to the Tactical
Coordination Line of a sufficient military presence to deter and respond to
incursions and incidents until such time as the threat is effectively
contained and the necessary Timorese capability to meet the threat is
operational.

* Maintenance of a security presence in other parts of Timor-Leste to
assist the police in ensuring stability.

* Improved ability to use information to assist in the tactical
employment of the infantry forces available, as well as greater
coordination and exchange of information with UNMISET police and with
Timor-Leste security agencies to improve effectiveness.

* Improved air and land mobility to enable more effective use of forces
available and more timely response in the event of incidents requiring
employment of peacekeeping forces.

*

* Promotion of relations with the public and improved public information
capability to enhance understanding of the military component's role and to
counter potential misinformation campaigns.

23. These adjustments would be adopted within the context of a simplified,
two-phase plan for the military component's deployment until the conclusion
of its mandate.

Phase 1: from the present to December 2003

24. During the first phase UNMISET would retain primary responsibility for
ensuring security, addressing problems that greatly surpass the present
capability of Timor-Leste security agencies and allowing them to mature and
develop. A larger military presence would be maintained in an expanded area
adjacent to the Tactical Coordination Line. A sector headquarters would be
maintained in the area to unify the command of forces deployed to limit
incursions. At present satisfactory progress is being made towards the
planned handover of border crossing points in mid-2003, and a specialized
Timor-Leste police border patrol unit will be deployed to its positions
along the border by the end of June 2003. When the management of border
crossing points is handed over, the military component will retain the
capability to respond upon the request of UNMISET police or to address an
imminent threat to security.

25. These tasks would entail the maintenance of the current level of
military deployment, at 3,870 troops, although the component would be
reconfigured to emphasize the capabilities identified above. To ensure that
a force of this limited size is capable of timely response, it will be
essential that troop-contributing countries provide the Force Commander
with the flexibility required to employ the portion of his force best
placed and equipped to undertake the tasks at hand. This phase would be
concluded once the relevant Timor-Leste agencies had attained adequate
operational capability to respond to threats to internal security,
particularly within the border area, and to respond to significant armed
threats elsewhere. The Timor-Leste Government is now reviewing plans to
significantly enhance the capability of the Timor-Leste police in both
areas, while their ability to respond to civil disturbance is also being
developed.

26. The Government has expressed a desire to adopt a comprehensive
arrangement governing the relationship between the Falintil-FDTL and the
military component of UNMISET that would make clear the terms under which
each of the two sides would conduct their respective individual operations
in the region of the Tactical Coordination Line and would define the terms
of cooperation for any joint actions. It will be important in the coming
months to find appropriate ways to address their needs, with the full
understanding and support of troop-contributing countries, while ensuring
that the necessary political and practical arrangements are in place.
Timor- Leste has also indicated a willingness to enter into bilateral
arrangements for enhancing defence and security.

Phase 2: from December 2003 to May 2004

27. Once the prerequisite Timor-Leste capability and capacity are
operational and able to take a lead responsibility in addressing the
challenges cited above, the military component will be reconfigured to act
as a deterrent and to respond preventively to threats to the security
environment. Other efforts will include operations to retain the trust and
confidence of the people of Timor-Leste, including through public
information, as well as close cooperation and information-sharing with
Timor-Leste agencies. The component would include 1,750 troops organized in
two response battalions, one of which would be located in the west and the
other centred in Dili.

28. During this phase final preparations would be made for the conclusion
of the handover of defence responsibility to Falintil-FDTL on 20 May 2004.
A protocol should also be developed to provide an appropriate structure for
the Timor-Leste defence force to back up the police, as required. The
corresponding arrangement within UNMISET offers one possible model for such
a protocol. Adequate development of police capabilities in the previous
phase is essential to ensure that requirement of such back-up support from
Falintil-FDTL to the Timor-Leste police is required only as a last resort.

29. On completion of the mandate, the peacekeeping force would cease
operations and concentrate on the orderly extraction of remaining forces in
the most expeditious manner possible.

B. Revised policing strategy

30. The development of a professional and capable police force in
Timor-Leste is essential if the State is to respond to threats to law and
order in a way that respects human rights and favours long-term stability
by strengthening public trust in the police. Support for the development of
such a force represents a key part of the UNMISET handover plan and of the
legacy that the United Nations should leave to the country.

31. Significant progress has been made: the Timor-Leste police, now at a
strength of 2,530, have assumed executive authority for all routine
policing matters in 6 of 13 districts. At the same time, the Government is
seeking to lay the legislative foundations to ensure the independence of
the Timorese police. However, recent developments have demonstrated that,
on the basis of its present strength, organization and training, the
Timor-Leste police are not yet in a position to address the more difficult
types of security threats that Timor-Leste is likely to face. Furthermore,
the period ahead presents inherent difficulties. Those districts that were
first handed over were those that were less subject to crime or political
instability. Some districts, such as Baucau, Viqueque and Dili, will pose
significantly greater challenges.

32. Further training and preparation are essential if the force is to
respond with the confidence and restraint that are crucial for lasting
popular support and gaining public trust. Already, efforts are under way to
promote the force's ability to contain civil disorders in urban areas,
through further training of the Rapid Intervention Unit. In addition, the
Government is reviewing plans to strengthen the capability of the
Timor-Leste police to address threats from criminal and armed groups in
rural areas and in the region of the Tactical Coordination Line. This
capability, which would be deployed in early 2004, would offer a means for
the Government to respond to major threats to public order without
resorting to the use of military.

33. In this context, the composition and strength of the police component
of UNMISET and the schedule for its downsizing would be adjusted to enhance
its operational capability to address civil disturbances and to improve
capability for the development of the Timor-Leste police to respond to the
weaknesses that have emerged. This would include the following specific
measures:

* Inclusion of an international formed police unit for one year, to be
better prepared for emergencies that exceed the capacity of the Rapid
Intervention Unit while it is still undergoing training. The company, which
would function under the command of the United Nations Police Commissioner,
would be based in Dili, but would also have a capacity for mobility.

* Additional training capacity is required to provide further
intensive training to the Timor-Leste police in crowd-control skills,
including in the appropriate use of force in accordance with international
standards. Other critical areas for additional training include police
administration, finance, logistics, forensics, tactical operations, border
security and community policing. This will not require significant
expansion of the police component: qualifications, rather than numbers, are
crucial at this time. The success of this initiative will depend upon the
full commitment of police-contributing countries to identifying police and
staff personnel that meet the specialized selection criteria that will be
circulated.

* Human rights and rule of law elements will be further emphasized in
the UNMISET development and certification process.

* The UNMISET downsizing plan should also be adjusted to allow for the
retention of a greater monitoring and advisory presence within districts
that have been handed over.

* The joint assessment mission that visited Timor-Leste in November 2002
outlined a road map for the assistance of the international community in
the months and years ahead. UNMISET, in consultation with Member States,
will assist the Government of Timor-Leste in elaborating the Government's
strategy for following up these recommendations with the necessary
assistance of the international community. The strategy will reflect the
priorities of the national development plan of Timor-Leste and be
underpinned by national policies addressing internal security and law and
order. The strengthening of the Timor- Leste police's capability for
management reforms, as a foundation for sustainable institutional
development, would receive the earliest attention.

34. Bilateral support will also remain crucial in key areas such as
investigation techniques, supervision and management, intelligence
collection and analysis, surveillance techniques and searching for and
detecting bombs, in addition to ensuring that the Timor-Leste police have
the required office facilities and accommodation when they are deployed to
the districts, in addition to weapons and equipment.

35. In downsizing, UNMISET would ensure that the handover takes place at a
pace that does not jeopardize stability while showing sensitivity to the
Government's desire to assume responsibility for security issues as soon as
is feasible. Planning for the gradual transfer of policing authority to
Timor-Leste will be adjusted to include safeguards and arrangements for
command and control that will allow the military component to play an
active role during the final phase of the Mission's mandate, and will
ensure that UNMISET has full control of the mechanism that would trigger
military back-up to police.

IV. Financial implications

36. My proposed budget for the period from 1 July 2003 to 30 June 2004
(A/57/689 of 5 February 2003) prepared in accordance with my downsizing
plan for the Mission (S/2002/432 of 17 April 2002) has been submitted to
the General Assembly. A revised budget that reflects changed requirements
for the same period will be submitted to the General Assembly for its
consideration during the main part of the Assembly's fifty-eighth session,
subject to the decision of the Security Council on my reconfiguration plan
for the Mission as set out in paragraphs 19 to 34 of the present report.

37. As at 31 January 2003, unpaid assessments to the special account for
the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor/UNMISET for
the period since the inception of the Mission amounted to $215.6 million.
The total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping
operations as at the same date amounted to $2,161.8 million.

V. Observations and recommendations

38. The international community has made a unique contribution to
Timor-Leste, one in which it has reason to take great pride. For most of
the past three years, the developments in Timor-Leste have suggested that
the country was unequivocally headed towards becoming a success story. But
recent developments suggest that the international community will need to
provide additional evidence of its commitment to completing successfully
the task that it has advanced thus far.

39. The present report offers a reassessment of the situation on the
ground, as foreseen by the Security Council, and suggests that the planning
that envisaged a steady downsizing of the international presence should be
reviewed. It is in this context that the proposals described in section III
above are presented for the Security Council's approval: the
reconfiguration of the military component and the adoption of a revised
phased approach to its mandate (including retention of its current ceiling
until December 2003) to better reflect the current threats; and the
enhancement of the operational ability of the international police
component as a short-term measure to promote security, with a simultaneous
increase in its ability to effectively train the Timor-Leste police to take
over responsibility for key tasks from international personnel.

40. These adjustments respond to factors that are external to the
operation. They do not represent a change in the broad concept of
operations of UNMISET, in its planned date of withdrawal or in its ultimate
goal, which is the creation of a viable Timor-Leste State having an
adequate and appropriate security capability. The additional resources that
they would require are modest compared with the investment made over the
past three years, but they could significantly enhance the international
community's ability to attain its goals.

41. It has always been clear that plans for this Mission were premised upon
the prevailing security situation, and the development of adequate
capability on the part of Timor-Leste to assume responsibility for security
tasks. The revised plans presented here in response to changed conditions
would be kept under constant assessment, and any significant improvement or
deterioration in the security environment would be reported to the Security
Council with the appropriate recommendations for action.

42. The impact of these adjustments will depend on the full commitment of
the Timor-Leste leadership, which shares the view that the measures
suggested here can play a critical role in promoting their country's
stability and security. Lasting stability will depend upon their strong
political support for the rule of law and their continuing efforts to
strengthen their country's governance and democratic institutions,
including a non-political and professional police.

43. Ongoing collaboration with Indonesia, building upon the statesmanlike
and courageous steps taken to date by the leadership of both countries, is
also crucial to address, inter alia, the continuing challenge posed by
refugees, to find suitable solutions regarding border crossings that can
favour social and economic progress, and to adhere to the agreements that
have been made regarding the delineation of the border by June 2003. As
mandated by the Security Council in paragraph 12 of its resolution 1410
(2002), UNMISET stands ready to assist the two Governments in addressing
these and other issues of bilateral concern, including through the
contribution made by its office in Jakarta.

44. Bilateral support will also be crucial to supplement the efforts of
UNMISET, including in the crucial areas of defence, police, justice and
corrections, as well as social and economic development. In addition, after
UNMISET concludes its mandate, it is likely that further assistance will be
required. A number of options could be explored by Member States, including
the deployment of qualified international police to key advisory positions
within the Timor-Leste police through multilateral, regional or bilateral
working arrangements with the Government of Timor-Leste.

45. The initial, successful progress that was achieved in Timor-Leste may
have favoured the development of unrealistic expectations. It is preferable
that the international community be reminded, before downsizing has
progressed beyond a point of no return, of the fragility of what has been
achieved early in the mandate of UNMISET.

46. In relation to the time required for any country to evolve towards
statehood, Timor-Leste's development remains extraordinarily rapid. Despite
the extraordinary historical, political and economic challenges that the
Timorese people have faced, I am confident that with an additional effort
by the international community, the success story that seemed so close to
becoming a reality will materialize, albeit somewhat less smoothly than had
been hoped; and that the stable Timor-Leste that the Timorese people have
sought so long, and for which they have sacrificed so much, is within reach.

Annex

Key adjustments to the downsizing plan for peacekeeping forces and United
Nations police [chart not included here]

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