On the occasion of 4th anniversary of the popular consultation,
and following the sentence to Adam Damiri, Free East Timor Japan
Coalition issued a statement calling for an international tribunal.

Kyo Kageura
------
Free East Timor Japan Coalition Calls for International Tribunal
August 29, 2003

Indonesian Tribunal a cover-up, rewarding those responsible for the
atrocities in East Timor with impunity. Japan Coalition calls for an
international tribunal.

--
On August 5, 2003, Indonesia's Ad Hoc Human Rights Court for East Timor
handed down a sentence to Major General Adam Damiri, marking the end of
the judicial process that brought eighteen defendants before the Ad Hoc
Court.

Damiri’s three-year sentence falls far short of the minimum ten-year
sentence required for crimes against humanity by Indonesia's own human
rights law, and is grossly insufficient, given the crimes for which Damiri
is responsible. In 1999, Damiri was commander of the Indonesian Army's
Udayana Military Command, under which gross human rights violations were
committed and widespread destruction carried out in East Timor.

The Ad Hoc Court acquitted twelve of the eighteen people tried. In addition,
most of the six defendants convicted were sentenced to less than the minimum
regulated by the Indonesian human rights law. The verdicts for the eighteen
are as follows:

Aug 14 2002: Abilio Soares (East Timorese), former governor of East Timor,
three-years imprisonment;
Aug 15 2002: Timbul Silaen, brigadier general, former East Timor police
chief, acquitted;
Aug 15 2002: (In relation to Suai massacre)
Herman Sudyono, lieutenant colonel, former bupati of Covalima District,
acquitted;
Lili Kusardiyanto, lieutenant colonel, former commander Suai District
Military Command, acquitted;
Ahmad Syamsudin, captain, former chief-of-staff Suai District Military
Command, acquitted;
Sugito, lieutenant, former commander Suai Military Sector Command,
acquitted;
Colonel Gatot Subiaktoro, lieutenant, former police chief of Suai,
acquitted;
Nov 27 2002: Eurico Gutteres, former Aitarak commander and former deputy
commander PPI, ten-years imprisonment;
Nov 29 2002: Endar Priyanto, lieutenant colonel, former Dili police
commander, acquitted;
Nov 29 2002: (In relation to Liquisa Church massacre)
Asep Kuswandi, lieutenant colonel, former Liquica military commander,
acquitted;
Adios Salova, lieutenant colonel, former police chief of Liquica,
acquitted;
Leoneto Martins, former bupati of Liquica, acquitted;
Dec 27 2002: Soedjarwo, lieutenant colonel, former Dili military commander,
five-years imprisonment;
Dec 30 2002: M. Yayat Sudrajat, colonel, Tribuana military unit chief,
acquitted;
Jan 20 2003: Hulman Gultom, Adj. Sr. Comr., former Dili police chief,
three-years imprisonment;
Mar 12 2003: M. Noer Muis, brigadier general, (Suhartono's successor),
five-years imprisonment
May 22 2003: Suhartono Suratman, brigadier general, former East Timor
military commander, acquitted;
Aug 5 2003: Adam Damiri, major general, former chief of Udayana Regional
Military Command, three-years imprisonment

From the outset we expressed our concern about the Indonesian Ad Hoc Human
Rights Court for East Timor and issued two statements, in August and
December 2002, calling for an international tribunal.

Now let us review the fundamental and legal problems involved in the
establishment of the Indonesian Court, as well as the problems that have
become clear in the court process.

a. First and foremost, the "East Timor issue" is an international issue,
namely, that of Indonesia's invasion of East Timor and its subsequent
illegal occupation. Furthermore, the violence before, during, and after the
popular consultation in 1999 was, as was clearly stated in the report of the
UN International Commission of Inquiry on East Timor (ICIET), committed in
breach of the agreement with the United Nations which specified that the
Indonesian authorities would be in charge of security; here too the issue is
international in nature. Thus allowing Indonesia to deal with the problem
itself contributes to obscuring the overall nature of the issue.

b. The jurisdiction of Indonesia's ad hoc courts was arbitrarily and
unacceptably limited to the crimes committed in April and September 1999 and
in only three of the thirteen districts of East Timor, i.e., Dili, Liquica,
and Cova Lima. Thus large massacres, such as that at the Maliana police
station on September 8, 1999, were excluded. These built-in limitations make
it impossible to examine the systematic nature of the overall context in
which the individual crimes were committed, which examination is a sine qua
non when dealing with crimes against humanity. This limited jurisdiction
meant that the Indonesian court, for all its claims to be dealing with
crimes against humanity, could not in fact function to do so.

c. Another aspect of the arbitrary limitation of jurisdiction is in relation
to the suspects indicted. For instance, Indonesia's own Commission of
Inquiry into Human Rights Violations in East Timor (KPP-HAM) listed in its
report thirty-three people to be investigated as suspects, including
Indonesian Army General Wiranto and Major General Zacky Anwar Makarim. Yet
the Indonesian court indicted only eighteen suspects, from which group top
military commanders were excluded.

d. In keeping with the limitations described in “b.” and “c.” above, the
prosecutors merely accused the defendants of failing to prevent the violence
of 1999, which violence, it was claimed, had occurred spontaneously. The
charges did not address the systematic nature of the violence and
destruction. As a result, prosecutors' requests were very light. The charge
against Abilio Soares, for instance, is ten and a half years, barely the
minimum required for a crime against humanity. Considering the obvious
systematic nature of the violence in 1999, clearly stated in both ICIET and
KPP-HAM reports, it is clear that the charges themselves fly in the face of
any serious effort to get at the truth. This distortion of the truth was
also obvious in the court proceedings and statement of Adam Damiri.

e. Due to the lack of a meaningful witness protection program, a number of
important witnesses could not attend the trials. But Indonesian military
personnel and their relatives filled the courtroom during the hearings, and
outside, ex-militias demonstrated. This was enough to make the obtaining of
relevant testimonies often impossible.

f. The prosecutors did not make proper use of the ICIET report and KPP-HAM
report, both published in January 2000. Nor did they summon those who were
involved in these investigations. International staff of UNAMET, which was
in charge of the 1999 popular consultation, and independent observers were
also not summoned as witnesses.

g. As the court was being set up, a lack of transparency in the selection of
judges and prosecutors was often pointed out.

Now that sentences have been handed down for all defendants and we can look
back on the process, we see all too clearly that that process was plagued
throughout by these problems and ended in failure because of them. Thus,
Indonesia's ad hoc court produced the following results, results which are
just the opposite of what should have been the court’s mission:

a. Instead of clarifying the truth about the establishment, training and
arming of militias by the Indonesian military, and its direction of the
systematic human right violations and destruction that took place, the court
consistently allowed itself to be used in the service of propaganda to
distort the truth, portraying the role of the Indonesian military as a
neutral body which failed to prevent what was supposedly a conflict between
"pro-integration" and "pro-independence" factions among East Timorese.

b. Instead of working to end the prevailing practice of impunity in
Indonesia by properly punishing those responsible for human right
violations, the court process in fact gave its stamp of approval to the
practice of impunity.

Unless those responsible for the crimes against humanity committed in East
Timor are duly called to account, pernicious effects, such as the following,
will be seen:

a. Cover-up of the truth and impunity for those responsible for the crimes
impedes reconciliation and casts a dark shadow on the future of East Timor.
As Isabel Amaral-Guterres, a member of the Reception, Truth and
Reconciliation Commission, stated: "we cannot achieve reconciliation without
justice. People want reconciliation, but reconciliation with justice."
Reconciliation will be obstructed if those responsible for the crimes are
not prosecuted legally.

b. Impunity for the Indonesian military will aggravates the situation in
various parts of Indonesia where the Indonesian military is today committing
human rights violations. On May 19, 2002 in Aceh, the Indonesian military
launched the biggest military operation since its 1975 invasion of East
Timor and continues to commit gross human rights violations there. Moreover
Adam Damiri plays an important role in commanding the operation. The
negative impact of Indonesia's Ad Hoc Human Rights Court for East Timor on
the behavior of the military with respect to human right violations and the
suppression of democracy is clearly observable here.

Recognizing that (a) Indonesia's court produced no legally valid results
that accord with international legal standards; (b) the East Timor issue is
an international issue, stemming from the Indonesian invasion of East Timor
and subsequent illegal occupation; and (c) the violence before, during and
after the popular consultations in 1999 was committed in violation of an
agreement between Indonesia and the UN, we believe that an international
legal process is essential to realize justice for the victims of human right
violations, crimes against humanity and war crimes committed in East Timor.
Taking into account the fact that the international community silently
accepted Indonesia's illegal occupation of East Timor for twenty-four years,
we believe that it must now make as a top priority the realization of
justice in an international framework for East Timor.

On the occasion of this, the fourth anniversary of the popular consultation,
we call for the establishment of an international tribunal for East Timor.

Free East Timor Japan Coalition
(Sapporo East Timor Association
Sendai East Timor Association
Tokyo East Timor Association
East Timor Solidarity, Shinsyu
Nagoya YWCA concerned group on East Timor
Osaka East Timor Association
Okayama Support Group for East Timor
Zentsuji Solidarity for East Timor
Shimonoseki East Timor Association
Oita Group for Asian-Japanese Relationships
Nagasaki Solidarity for East Timor
Japan Catholic Justice and Peace Commission)

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